'Abenomics' refers to a new unconventional economic policy regime in Japan since late 2012. It consists of the three arrows: unconventional monetary policy (the first arrow), expansionary fiscal policy (the second arrow), and economic growth strategies to encourage private investment (the third arrow). After the new regime started, both the stock market and the foreign exchange market reacted very favorably. The purpose of this paper is to investigate why the markets reacted to the new regime so favorably. Unlike orthodox arguments, we focus on asymmetric behavior between local and foreign investors after December 2012. We show that under the new regime, foreign investors were aggressive in purchasing Japanese stocks and in selling the Japanese yen, while local investors were not. By using high frequency intra-daily data, both structural break tests and regression analysis show that various news shocks had more significant impacts on the stock prices and exchange rates in nighttime than in daytime even if they were revealed in daytime. Noting that local investors tend to trade in daytime, while foreign investors tend to trade in nighttime, this implies that the dramatic market responses to the new regime happened only in time zones when foreign investors were active. However, the asymmetry might have been less significant after the market crash on May 23, 2013.
I. Introduction
'Abenomics' refers to the new economic policy regime advocated by the Prime Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe. It is a set of policy measures meant to resolve Japan's macroeconomic problems. It consists of the three arrows: unconventional monetary policy (the first arrow), expansionary fiscal policy (the second arrow), and economic growth strategies to encourage private investment (the third arrow). Through the three arrows, the Japanese government tried to revive its economy through implementing bold economic policies that will pull its economy out of prolonged deflation, depreciate Japanese yen, and induce CPI inflation rate of 2% per year.
Both the stock market and the foreign exchange market reacted to the new policy regime very favorably. Figure 1 depicts daily data of the Japanese stock price index (Nikkei 225, 3pm in Tokyo) and the yen-dollar exchange rates (5pm in Tokyo) from January 2012 to October 2014.
Before Mr. Abe came to power in December 2012, the stock price index stagnated around 9,000 yen. However, it rose up to 10,688 yen at the beginning of January 2013 and exceeded 15,000 yen on May 15, 2013. Abenomics was also successful in achieving depreciation of the yen, However, the improved market environments can be the first step toward a much brighter future in the Japanese economy.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate why the markets reacted to the new policy regime so favorably. Unlike orthodox arguments, we focus on asymmetric behavior between local and foreign investors under the new regime. We show that under the new regime, foreign investors were aggressive in purchasing Japanese stocks and in selling the Japanese yen, while local investors were not. One may argue that the markets reacted favorably because they expected strong recovery of Japanese macro fundamentals under the new regime. It is true that after the dramatic changes of the stock prices and the Japanese yen, Japanese macro fundamentals also improved substantially. In particular, consumer spending pushed first quarter economic growth up 3.5 percent annually and remained strong in the second quarter of 2013. However, these improvements seem to be the results of the favorable market responses rather than the causes of them. In fact, various surveys clearly show that the improved confidences of Japanese consumers and enterprises lagged behind the favorable market responses. More importantly, even in the markets, the responses to the new regime were very different between local and foreign investors. That is, various data suggest that after Mr. Abe came to power, only foreign investors were aggressive in purchasing Japanese stocks and in selling Japanese yen. This implies that there have been highly heterogeneous views on Abenomics in the markets. In the following analysis, we explore whether the heterogeneity was a main source of the favorable market responses to Abenomics.
To capture heterogeneity, we particularly focus on intra-daily data which splits the market data into daytime changes and nighttime changes and explore whether there was conspicuous asymmetry across the time zones under Abenomics. In the analysis, we first apply structural break tests to examine whether stock prices and yen-dollar rates had structural break(s) in daytime and in nighttime. We then investigate whether news shocks under Abenomics were responsible to the structural break(s) by regression analysis. We draw inferences about the impact of various news shocks on the behavior of stock prices and exchange rates. The regression results suggest that before the market crash on May 23, 2013, various news shocks about Abenomics had more significant impacts on the stock prices and exchange rates in Japan nighttime than in Japan daytime even if the shocks were revealed in Japan daytime. Noting that local investors tend to trade in daytime, while foreign investors tend to trade in nighttime, this implies that the dramatic market responses under the new regime happened only in time zones when foreign investors were active. However, the asymmetry might have disappeared after the market crash on May 23, 2013.
Even among economists, foreign economists tended to be favorable to Abenomics. For example, in his column in New York Times, Krugman (2013) suggested that Japan had a prolonged slump mainly because it's hard getting policy makers to accept the need for bold action. He then praised Abenomics stating that "Mr. Abe has thumbed his nose at orthodoxy, with excellent results". IMF (2013) also wrote a favorable country report to Abenomics stating that "Japan's near-term economic prospects have improved with the adoption of vigorous macroeconomic policies combining fiscal stimulus with unprecedented monetary easing". In contrast, not a few Japanese economists were still conservative in evaluating Abenomics. For example, Ueda (2013) argued that "a non-negligible portion of the asset price response seems based on investors' excess optimism concerning the effectiveness of non-conventional monetary policy". At this stage, it is still too soon to evaluate which view is correct. However, the data clearly shows that at least before May 23, 2013, it was foreign investors' responses that improved the market sentiments under the new regime. Given the fact, we may conclude that the initial impacts of Abenomics might not have been so successful unless foreign investors reacted to the new policy regime favorably.
In literature of financial economics, the efficient-market hypothesis (EMH) asserts that financial markets are "informationally efficient". In consequence of this, one cannot consistently achieve returns in excess of average market returns on a risk-adjusted basis, given the information available at the time the investment is made. The semi-strong-form EMH claims that prices which reflect all publicly available information instantly change to reflect new public information. To the extent that EMH holds, the market should have had much larger responses in daytime than in nighttime because most of the news about Abenomics were revealed in daytime. Out finding, however, suggested the opposite. That is, the market responded more in nighttime than in daytime. This suggests that highly heterogeneous views persisted between daytime and nighttime investors at least at the first stage of Abenomics.
There are a large number of papers which explored unconventional policies in Japan (see, for example, Fujiwara (2006) , Honda et al. (2007) , Oda and Nagahata (2008) , Ueda (2012) , Koeda (2013) , Nakazono and Ueda, (2013) , and Honda (2014)) 2 . In particular, Rogers et al. (2014) examined the effects of unconventional monetary policy by central banks in advanced countries on bond yields, stock prices and exchange rates by using intradaily data. But few explored them by using high frequency data with market-specific features. In investigating market-specific features by intra-daily data, our analysis has motivations that are similar to those in Ito and Roley (1987) , Tsutsui and Hirayama (2010), and Fukuda (2012) . These studies pointed out that there were different market responses in different time zones. However, no previous studies explored market-specific features under Abenomics. Investigating what happened under the new regime in Japan is worthwhile to be noted because Abenomics had dramatic impacts on the markets. The paper proceeds as follows. Sections 2 and 3 investigate who responded to Abenomics and when the markets responded respectively. After testing structural changes in intra-daily data in section 4, the regression analysis in section 5 shows that various news shocks had more significant impacts on the stock prices and exchange rates in Japan nighttime. Section 6 summarizes our main results and refers to their implications.
2 There are a huge number of studies that explored the effects of unconventional monetary policy by central banks in advanced countries. See, for example, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), Rosa (2012) , Gambacorta et al. (2014) , and Lambert and Ueda (2014) fore recent contributions.
II. Who Responded to Abenomics Favorably?
After Mr. Abe came to power, both the stock market and the foreign exchange market reacted to the new policy regime very favorably. However, the reactions were asymmetric between local and foreign investors. In this section, we provide some basic statistics that may support such a view. When exploring who responded to Abenomics favorably, we can observe conspicuous asymmetric behavior between local and foreign investors when exploring who purchased Japanese stocks after November 2012. (Nikkei 225) and with that in the yen-dollar exchange rate. The weekly data from January 2012 to October 2014 is obtained from Trading Value by Investor Type Tokyo and Nagoya by Tokyo Stock Exchange. To allow structural breaks, we calculated the correlation not only for the whole sample but also for the subsamples (Jan. 2012 -Oct. 2012 , Nov. 2012 -Dec. 2013 , Dec. 2012 -May 2013 , and Jan. 2014 -Oct. 2014 ). The correlation was in marked contrast between that by foreign investors and that by local investors. In case of foreign investors, the amount of net purchases had been positively correlated with the changes in the stock price index and the yen-dollar rates. This was true even (1) Japan Daytime and Nighttime
In the last section, we presented a view that both the stock market and the foreign exchange market reacted to the new policy regime favorably because Abenomics changed market sentiments of foreign investors. In this section, we reexamine this view through exploring when the markets responded favorably. Exploring when the Japanese stock price increased and the yen-dollar rate depreciated, we can observe conspicuous asymmetry across the time zones after November in 2012. takes place not only in Osaka but also in Chicago. We define the price change from Osaka close (3:15pm in Osaka) to Chicago close (3:15pm in Chicago, 6:15am in Osaka) as the price change in Japan nighttime. We then compare it with that in Japan daytime which is defined as the price change from Chicago close to Osaka close. To check its robustness, we also use the changes of Nikkei 225 (spot trading). In case of Nikkei 225, trade takes place only from 9am to 3pm in Japan time. But potential orders in Japan nighttime are priced in the first few minutes after 9am in Japan time. We thus regard the price change from 3pm in Tokyo to 9:15am in Tokyo in the following business day as the price change in Japan nighttime and compare it with that in Japan daytime (from 9:15am in Tokyo to 3pm in Tokyo).
In contrast with the stock markets, the foreign exchange market is open 24 hours a day. We thus define the change of the yen-dollar rate from 9am in Tokyo to 5pm in Tokyo as the exchange rate change in Japan daytime and that from 5pm in Tokyo to 9am in Tokyo in the following business day as the exchange rate change in Japan nighttime. To check its robustness, we also report the change from 5pm in Tokyo to 5pm in New York as an alternative measure for that in Japan nighttime.
(2) The Stock Prices Table 2 Theoretically, both local and foreign investors can trade in any markets in the world. But it is natural to suppose that Japanese local investors tend to trade in Japan daytime, while foreign investors tend to trade in Japan nighttime. The above result thus suggests that the dramatic stock market boom under Abenomics happened only in time zones when foreign investors were active.
(3) The yen-dollar exchange rates Table 3 summarizes basic statistics (average and standard deviation) of the daily change of the yen-dollar exchange rate from January 2012 to October 2014. It reports its change in Japan daytime (from 9am in Tokyo to 5pm in Tokyo) and that in Japan nighttime (from 5pm in Tokyo to 9am in Tokyo in the following business day). To check its robustness, it also reports the change in an alternative Japan nighttime (from 5pm in Tokyo to 5pm in New York). It is easy to see that for the full sample period and for sub-periods until December 2013, the average was negative in daytime but positive in nighttime.
3 This implies that the Japanese yen tended to appreciate in daytime and depreciate in nighttime. Even before November 2012, the Japanese 
IV. Tests of Structural Changes in Intra-daily Data
In the last section, we showed evidence that both the stock price and the yen-dollar rate had asymmetric responses under Abenomics depending on the time zone. The asymmetric responses may explain why the markets reacted to the announced new policy regime so favorably. In the following sections, we will examine the validity of this conjecture through formal econometric tests based on intra-daily data. This section first applies structural break tests to explore when the stock price and the yen-dollar rate in daytime and in nighttime had structural break(s).
Unlike the Chow test which tests for regime change at a priori known date, we apply two alternative tests where the break date is unknown. One is the Quandt-Andrews test which modified the Chow framework to consider the F-statistic with the largest value over all possible break dates. Andrews (1993) derived the limiting distribution of the related test statistics.
Assuming 15% trimming, we use them to identify a single unknown break date and to test the significant level of the structural break. The other is the Bai-Perron test which extended the Quandt-Andrews framework by allowing for multiple unknown breakpoints. Bai and Perron (2003) provided theoretical and computational results. Assuming 15% trimming and allowing error distributions to differ across breaks, we use them to explore multiple unknown break dates and their significance.
To test structural break(s), we estimate the following equations for daytime and nighttime changes in the Nikkei Futures and in the yen-dollar exchange rate respectively.
(
where ln(DSt)  logged difference of the daytime stock price index, ln(NSt)  logged difference of the nighttime stock price index, ln(DEt)  logged difference of the daytime yen-dollar rate, and ln(NEt)  logged difference of the nighttime yen-dollar rate.
Equations (1) - (4) in London, and that of Hang Seng index in Hong Kong for ln(X j t). The second type of exogenous variable Yt is a daily change of US long-term interest rate. Specifically, we use the latest yield change of 5-year US government bond. Although US short-term interest rate hit its zero bound, the 5-year US government bond yield was still positive in our sample period. Thus, it is likely that Yt reflects the change of the US monetary policy in our sample period. 4 The third type of exogenous variable ln(Z j t), which is included only in equations (3) and (4), is a daily growth rate of the euro-dollar exchange rate. Specifically, we use the latest change of the euro-dollar exchange rate in Japan daytime and that in Japan nighttime. We included ln(Z j t) to capture exogenous shocks that are specific to the foreign exchange market outside Japan.
The estimation period is from the beginning of January in 2011 to the end of October in 2014. We use the Nikkei 225 Futures from 6:15am to 3:15pm or the Nikkei 225 from 9:15am to 3pm for the daytime stock price index, and the Nikkei 225 Futures from 3:15pm to 6:15am in the following business day or the Nikkei 225 from 9am to 9:15am in the following business day for the nighttime stock price index. We also use the yen-dollar rate from 9am to 5pm in Tokyo for the daytime yen-dollar rate, and the yen-dollar rate from 5pm to 9am in Tokyo in the following business day or the yen-dollar rate from 5pm in Tokyo to 5pm in New York for the nighttime yen-dollar rate. Moreover, its LR and Wald F-statistic could detect no significant structural break for Nikkei 225 (spot price) in equations (1) and (3). Noting that a series of policy schemes were announced in January 2013, this suggests that daytime investors, who are likely to be local investors, made marginal change of their behavior only after specific features of Abenomics were revealed. Futures and Nikkei 225 (spot price), their scaled F-statistic suggests that there were more than one significant structural break. But in all cases, the test static for the null of 0 vs. 1 detected the exactly the same break date as that in the Quandt-Andrews test. Moreover, the other detected dates were, if any, either before Abenomics or after the market crash in late May 2013. Thus, even if we allow multiple structural breaks, we still find that Abenomics changed the behavior of nighttime investors before specific policy schemes were announced, while it changed the behavior of daytime investors only after a series of policy schemes were announced in January 2013.
V. Estimation Based on Intra-daily Data
In the last section, we implemented structural break tests and found that the structural break dates were asymmetric across daytime and nighttime investors. In this section, we test the existence of asymmetric responses in intra-daily data by using a structural break dummy and news dummies. Specifically, based on a structural break dummy and four types of news shocks, we modify equations (1) -(4) and estimate the following explanatory equations:
6) ln(NSt) = const. + D2 + a2 ln(DSt) + b2 ln(NSt-1) + j d2,j ln(X j t) + e2,jYt + k 2,k D1kt + k 2,k D2kt + k 2,k D3kt + k 2,k D4kt, (7) ln(DEt) = const. + D3 + a3 ln(DEt-1) + b3 ln(NEt-1)
The first and second lines of each equation examine how the structural break in the Quandt-Andrews test changed the determinants of the stock price and exchange rate growth in daytime and in nighttime. In the analysis, we consider a structural break dummy D1 for ln(DSt), D2 for ln(NSt), D3 for ln(DEt), and D4 for ln(NEt). Each dummy takes one after the structural break in the Quandt-Andrews test and zero otherwise. We included each dummy not only for the constant term but also for the coefficient dummies.
The third line of each equation examines how various news shocks affected the the stock price and exchange rate growth in each time zone. In the analysis, we consider four types of news: news on monetary policy (D1k), news on fiscal policy (D2k), news on Abe's growth strategies (D3k), and news on the elections which led the LDP (Abe's party) to the dominant party in the lower and the upper houses of parliament (D4k). The list of each type of news shocks was summarized in Table 6 . For D1k's and D4k's, we include a dummy variable which takes one only on the event day and zero otherwise. For D2k's and D3k's, we include a dummy variable which takes one on the three consequent business days on and before the event day (that is, T, T-1, and T-2 where T is the event day) and zero otherwise. The latter allows for the fact that news on fiscal policy and on Abe's growth strategies tended to be partially revealed before the formal announcement.
Except for D101 (that is, Abe's announcement to adopt unlimited monetary expansion), news dummies on monetary policy are those for each BOJ's "Statement on Monetary Policy" after December 2012. After preliminary regressions, we included them only when they were statistically significant at least in one of the four equations. Among thirteen dummies on monetary policy, D101, 102, D103, and D104 are dummies when Shirakawa was BOJ Governor, while the other D1k's are those after Kuroda became BOJ Governor. In particular, D105 is the dummy for Governor Kuroda's first "Statement on Monetary Policy" which introduced the "Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing (QQE)" and committed to achieve 2% inflation target in 2 years. Since the effect of QQE on the markets was very large, we also included its lagged dummy D105(-1) which takes one on the day after the Kuroda's first statement and zero otherwise. D113 is the dummy for the BOJ's announcement on the expansion of QQE in The news dummies on elections consist of four dummies. D41 is a dummy for the day when the late Prime Minister Noda declared to dissolve the lower house. On the day after the Noda's declaration, Abe who was a leader of the LDP (the Liberal Democratic Party) announced his new policy to overcome deflation and to adopt unlimited monetary expansion. Since the LDP was expected to win the election, we can regard it as the first news on Abenomics. D43 is a dummy for the election day of the lower house, while D44 is a dummy for the election day of the upper house. Since each election was held on Sunday, each of them takes one only on the day after the election and zero otherwise. After the two elections, the LDP dominated both the upper and lower houses.
VI. The Estimation Results of Nikkei 225 Futures
(1) Control Variables By using Nikkei 225 Futures, we estimated equations (5) and (6) from January 5, 2011 to October 31, 2014. Table 7 reports the estimation results. Although some of the coefficients took the same sign in the two time zones, most coefficients showed different sign and significance level between the two time zones, implying asymmetric responses in daytime and nighttime stock price changes.
In the table, none of the constant term was significant. It was true even for the structural break dummy. This implies that even though Nikkei 225 Futures increased dramatically under Abenomics, there was no significant structural break in its average growth when we control the effects of the lag dependent variables and external variables. In contrast, several coefficient dummies indicate that there was a structural change in the effects of the lag dependent variables and external shocks especially in nighttime.
Regarding the effects of the lag dependent variables (DDAY(-1) and DNIGHT(-1)), they were significant before the structural break especially in daytime. This implies that there was some persistency in the intra-daily change of Nikkei 225 Futures before the structural break.
However, their coefficient dummies suggest that the persistency became smaller after the structural break. Abenomics might have increased short-term volatility of Nikkei Futures.
Regarding the effects of the external shocks, Hang Seng index in Hong Kong (DHK) had largest impact in daytime, and so did NY Dow (DDOW) in nighttime. In nighttime, FT100 in London (DFT) and US government bond yield (DUSGB) also had significantly positive impact.
The results suggest that the impact is larger when the time zone is synchronized. However, the coefficient dummy indicates that several coefficients had a substantial structural change in nighttime. That is, nighttime Nikkei 225 Futures responded to NY Dow, FT100 in London, and US government bond yield more sensitively after Abenomics than before Abenomics. In contrast, a structural change in the effects of the external shocks was, if any, small in daytime.
This implies that nighttime investors, who are likely to be foreign investors, became more sensitive to the external shocks since Abenomics started. Regarding the news shocks on fiscal policy, D21 and D22 were significantly positive in nighttime, while D22 was significantly negative in daytime. The news shocks on fiscal policy which were revealed at the beginning of Abenomics had positive effect on Nikkei 225 Futures only in nighttime. This implies that only nighttime investors showed positive responses to the fiscal expansion news which were revealed in daytime. However, D25 was significantly negative only in nighttime. The fiscal policy news which was announced a year after Abenomics started had negative effect on Nikkei 225 Futures in nighttime.
As for the election news shocks, we can observe significant rises in Nikkei 225 Futures only in nighttime on the day when the late Prime Minister Noda decided to dissolve the lower house (D41) and on the day when the lower house was dissolved (D42). Given the fact that the LDP led by Abe was expected to win the following election, this implies that only nighttime investors showed a significantly positive reaction to the news that Abe's party would dominate the lower house. However, because of no surprise in the election results, neither daytime nor nighttime investors showed a significantly positive response in Nikkei 225 Futures on the election day of the lower house (D43) and the upper house (D44).
VII. The Estimation Results of the Yen-Dollar Rates (1) Control Variables
By using the intra-daily yen-dollar rate, we estimated equations (7) and (8) we still observe asymmetric responses in daytime and nighttime changes.
In the table, the constant term was significantly positive in nighttime, while it was insignificant in daytime. Reflecting carry trade in the foreign exchange market, the yen-dollar rate tended to depreciate in nighttime even before Abenomics. However, the structural break dummy was not significant in either daytime or nighttime. This implies that even though the yen-dollar rate depreciated dramatically under Abenomics, there was no significant structural break in its average growth when we control the effects of the lag dependent variables and external variables. In addition, unlike in Nikkei 225 Futures, there was no structural change in the effect of the lag dependent variables either. However, several coefficient dummies indicate that there was a structural change in the effects of the external shocks.
As in Nikkei 225 Futures, reflecting time synchronization, Hang Seng index in Hong Kong (DHK) had largest positive impact in daytime. But unlike in Nikkei 225 Futures, US government bond yield (DUSGB) had significantly negative impact in daytime. In nighttime, NY Dow (DDOW) and FT100 in London (DFT) had significantly positive impact, while US government bond yield had significantly negative impact. The results may suggest that the impact is larger when the time zone is synchronized. However, the synchronized change of the euro-dollar rate had large positive impact on the yen-dollar rate only in nighttime.
The coefficient dummies indicate that the effects of NY DOW, Hang Seng index, and US government bond yield had a substantial structural change both in daytime and in nighttime.
Unlike in Nikkei 225 Futures, the intra-daily yen-dollar rate responded to external shocks more sensitively after Abenomics than before Abenomics not only in nighttime but also in daytime.
However, the coefficient dummies took opposite sign for DDOW and DHK. Moreover, the coefficient dummy of the euro-dollar rate (DEURO) was significant only in nighttime. This implies that the effects of the external shocks were not symmetric between daytime and nighttime investors. Under the Shirakawa regime, nighttime investors reacted to the BOJ's announcements more in nighttime than in daytime, even though each announcement was made in daytime.
As in Nikkei 225 Futures, the first statement by Governor Kuroda (D105), which announced the QQE, had large positive effect on the yen-dollar rate both in daytime and in nighttime. After the QQE was announced in the early afternoon in Japan, daytime investors first made large reaction and then nighttime investors made additional reaction in the foreign exchange market. But as in Nikkei 225 Futures, the coefficient of D105 (-1) indicates that the reaction of the yen-dollar rate continued on the next day only in nighttime. Even in the yen-dollar rate, it was nighttime investors who made more persistent responses to the new policy shock.
Because of no significant additional policy change, the reactions of the yen-dollar rate were insignificant to most of the BOJ's statements from May 2013 to September 2014. However, unlike in Nikkei 225 Futures, the effect of BOJ's announcements tended to have a negative effect on the yen-dollar rate in daytime than in nighttime from May 2013 to August 2013.
Specifically, D106, D107, and D108 were significantly negative in daytime, while D107 was significantly negative in daytime during the period.
In contrast, the extension of QQE on October 31, 2014 had large positive effect on the yen-dollar rate only in daytime. The feature is also in marked contrast with Nikkei 225 Futures which showed a large positive response both in daytime and in nighttime (5) The other news shocks
Regarding the other news shocks, the election news shocks had less significant effect on the yen-dollar rate than on Nikkei 225 Futures. However, the news shocks on fiscal policy which were revealed at the beginning of Abenomics still had positive effect on the yen-dollar rate mostly in nighttime. Specifically, D21 and D23 were significantly positive in nighttime, while D23 was significantly positive but D24 was significantly negative in daytime. This implies that nighttime investors were likely to show a positive response to the fiscal expansion news at the beginning of Abenomics. However, D25 was significantly negative only in nighttime. As in Nikkei 225 Futures, the fiscal policy news which was announced a year after Abenomics started had negative effect on the yen-dollar rate in nighttime.
As in Nikkei 225 Futures, two dummies for the third arrow (that is, growth strategies) were never significantly positive in nighttime. But D31 was significantly negative in daytime. As in Nikkei 225 Futures, neither daytime nor nighttime investors welcomed the third arrow (that is, growth strategies) in the foreign exchange market.
VIII. Concluding Remarks
The Japanese economy had experienced prolonged deflation since the late 1990s. In order to 'reflate' its economy, Abenomics implemented quantitative easing, fiscal policy through expanding government spending, and provide economic growth strategies. Both the stock market and the foreign exchange market reacted to the new policy regime very favorably at least before the market crash on May 23, 2013. But there was conspicuous asymmetric behavior between local and foreign investors under the new regime. In this paper, we explored who reacted to Abenomics favorably and when it happened.
We found that foreign investors' responses to the new regime played a leading role in improving the market sentiments. In particular, we found that before May 2013, most of the news shocks on Abenomics had a significant effect only on nighttime changes even if they were revealed in daytime. Noting that foreign investors tend to trade in Japan nighttime, it suggests that the dramatic market responses under Abenomics happened only in time zones when foreign investors were active.
It is beyond scope of this paper to see why there were asymmetric responses between local and foreign investors. We may attribute them to asymmetric risk tolerance or asymmetric information across investors. Overconfidence by foreign investors and pessimistic views by local investors may explain the asymmetry. Although we need further data and evidence, it will be an important research agenda to see why only foreign investors reacted to Abenomics favorably. However, the asymmetry might have been less significant after the market crash on May 23, 2013. 2) F-statistic means "Scaled F-statistic".
3) * Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, and *** Significant at the 1% level.
Nikkei 225 2) * Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, and *** Significant at the 1% level. 2) * Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, and *** Significant at the 1% level.
3) DDAY = Daytime change of the yen-dollar rate, DNIGHT = Nighttime change of the yen-dollar rate, and DEURO = Daytime change of the euro-dollar rate when DDAY is dependent variable and nighttime change of the euro-dollar rate when DNIGHT is dependent 
